



Of the multitude of questions that beset analysis of the functions of,
and justifications for, philanthropy, one subset is generated by the phe-
nomenon of charitable giving by business corporations. Do (or should)
such corporations have the power to make philanthropic gifts? If so,
what are the functions of such giving and what, if any, should be its lim-
its? In light of the functions and limits on such giving, who in the struc-
ture of the corporation (management? stockholders collectively? stock-
holders individually? others?) should make the decisions as to the
amounts to be given and as to the identity of the donees?
There has been episodic discussion over whether corporations do, or
should, have the power, by management decision or majority (or even
unanimous) shareholder vote, to make philanthropic gifts.' If a business
expenditure is one from which the corporation cannot possibly derive
any benefit of any kind, common law doctrine suggests that the enter-
prise lacks the power to do so, at least as against dissenting stockholders'
claims if not also third persons' claims.The theory appears to be (regard-
less of whether it is cast in terms of ultra vires) that the legal function of
the corporation and its management is to preserve and enhance the
value of the assets for its stockholders. This can only be done legitimately
if some net benefit to the corporation and its stockholders follows, or is
reasonably expected to follow, from its use or expenditure of such assets.
Legislation, by expressly empowering corporations to make charitable
gifts,2 has undercut the doctrinal obstacle to the power to make such gifts.
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1 Symposium:" Corporate SocialResponsibility: Paradigm or Paradox?,84 CorneU L Rev 1133
(1999); Corporate Philanthropy Symposium,28 Stetson L Rev 1 (1998);Nancy J. Knauer, The Para-
dox of Corporate Giving: Tax Expenditures, the Nature of the Corporation, and the Social Construc-
tion of Charity,44 DePaul LRev 1 (1994);Faith Stevelman Kahn,Pandora's Box.ManagerialDiscre-
tion and the Problem of Corporate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L Rev 581 (1994); David L. Engel,An
Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 Stan L Rev 1 (1979); Henry G. Manne, The Limits
and Rationale of Corporate Altruism: An Individualistic Model, 59 Va L Rev 708 (1973); Phillip I.
Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Social Crisis, 50 BU L Rev 157 (1970).
2 See, for example, 8 Del Code Ann § 122(9) (2001) (granting corporations the power to
"[m]ake donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific or educational purposes, and in
time of war or other national emergency in aid thereof"); Model Business Corporation Act § 3.02(13)
(1998) (granting corporations the power"to make donations for the public welfare, or for charitable,
scientific, or educational purposes"); id at § 3.02(15) (granting corporations the power "to make
payments or donations, or do any other act, not inconsistent with law, that furthers the business and
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Reasonable arguments can be offered to support such power in corpora-
tions.
However, acknowledgment of this corporate power shifts the in-
quiry to the question of authority-who in the corporate structure is (or
should be) authorized to cause a charitable expenditure from which no
benefit of any kind is (or is expected to be) received by the corporation
or its stockholders? This paper focuses on whether this authority should
be vested in stockholders individually or in corporate management.'
It is important to note at the outset that this paper focuses on only
certain kinds of currently denominated corporate charitable donations.
Many corporate charitable donations to nonprofit enterprises or chari-
ties are indistinguishable from ordinary business expenditures made to
realize imminent, visible corporate operating gains.! Other corporate do-
affairs of the corporation"). The provisions thus "empowering" the corporation eliminate any argu-
ment about ultra vires, but they do not state who in the corporate structure should decide on desig-
nees. For variations among state statutes, see Faith Stevelman Kahn, Legislatures Courts and the
SEC: Reflections on Silence and Power in Corporate and Securities Law, 41 NY L Sch L Rev 1107,
1110-15 (1997).
3 In theory other stakeholders (for example, employees, creditors, customers, and suppliers)
could also be considered.
4 See Sophia A. Muirhead, Corporate Contributions: The View from 50 Years 8-9, Research
Report No 1249-99-RR (Conference Board 1999). In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries, labor-related considerations dictated such corporate charitable giving (for example, railroads
giving to the YMCA to house their workers). See F Emerson Andrews, Philanthropic Giving 235-36
(Russell Sage Foundation 1950). See also authorities cited in Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Philanthropy
and the Business Corporation 10-11 (Russell Sage Foundation 1972). More recently, contributions
are significant components of programs of marketing or advertising the corporation's products and
services and attracting employee loyalty by associating the corporate identity and its products or ser-
vices with a particular cause (like child care and welfare, family life, environment, or health causes)
or a widely publicized nonprofit event (such as college or amateur sporting events or the Olympics).
See, for example, Knauer, 44 DePaul L Rev at 60-71 (cited in note 1) (analyzing the marketing func-
tions of charitable giving); Edwin McDowell, The Parade of Corporate Sponsors:Marketers Line Up
to Link Their Names to Events, NY Times Cl (July 16,1999) (detailing corporate sponsorship of fes-
tivals, fairs and annual events). By publicly and visibly connecting to those activities, the corporation
seeks to attract the approval of consumers of its goods, products, or services and the loyalty of its
employees who are affected by their interest in the causes or events thus subsidized. Correlatively,
fundraisers for such enterprises seek to sell their aura to the "donating" business corporation. See,
for exampleTimothy S. Mescon and Donn J.Tilson, Corporate Philanthropy:A StrategicApproach to
the Bottom Line, 29 Cal Mgt 49,51-58 (1987) (discussing the "new-style philanthropy" that empha-
sizes tangible returns for corporate gifts);1999 Cone/Roper Cause Related Trends Report: The Evolu-
tion of Cause Branding 18,19-22 (Cone). Such charitable expenditures differ from the corporation's
more conventional mechanisms for affecting its sales and marketing, in part because they less explic-
itly tout the quality or benefit of its products and in part because they entail hiring an outside non-
profit enterprise instead of an outside for-profit advertising enterprise to sell the corporation's prod-
ucts or services. But each may plausibly be said to require decisionmaking by management-both by
reason of their integration with other operations of the business and by the claimed identifiable sig-
nificance of their contributions to the bottom line. Similarly, corporate contributions include "loans"
of corporate executives or employees to serve in the charitable organization. Muirhead, Corporate
Contributions at 9. These contributions should "mesh with the company's markets or employees" Id
at 7. But commentators suggest that there is little reliable evidence to connect such giving with the
bottom line. For a general discussion, see Knauer, 44 DePaul L Rev at 53-56 (cited in note 1); Kahn,
44 UCLA L Rev at 662-74 (cited in note 1); Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Discretion of Corporate Manage-
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nations can be characterized as "goodwill" gifts that seek to improve the
public image of the corporation (rather than simply the loyalty and ef-
forts of its employees or the immediate attractiveness to consumers of its
products or services) in a way that arguably will produce future intangi-
ble benefits from a favorable public image of the firm. The corporate
welfare that is said to be promoted by such giving (including giving to
expressive and research organizations) is public approval of the corpora-
tion's role as a "good citizen." That public appreciation entails a vision of
the corporation as a player in a society that does not welcome regulation
or taxation of business.6 The corporate benefit from that public attitude
cannot be measured in accounting terms,7 but it apparently counts to le-
ment to Do Good at the Expense of Shareholder Gain-A Survey of, and Commentary on, the U&
Corporate Law, 13 Can-US L J 65-67 (1988) (asserting that some charitable activities are closely
linked with corporate activities).
5 See A.P Smith Manufacturing Co v Barlow, 98 A2d 581,583-86 (NJ 1953) (discussing indi-
rect corporate benefits flowing from charitable donations). Such corporate giving is, and appears to
be, remote from the company's visible business needs. Essentially unrestricted gifts to universities,
nonprofit medical or scientific research, art museums, concert or opera companies, public enterprises
like libraries or public television, "think tanks," or many kinds of institutions that render services to
the community and carry the aura of motherhood and apple pie, like the Red Cross or the Girl
Scouts, create the kind of good will that warms the hearts of the corporation's public relations ex-
perts.That those expenditures may also result in a general enhanced receptivity for the enterprises'
products or services or loyalty from its employees is a happy additional benefit, but does not appear
to be at the core of the drive to donate. Essentially, the "benefit" that these expenditures can be said
to offer to the corporation may reflect managerial long-term strategic conceptions, but they need not
be arranged by management to mesh with the daily or short-term operations of the enterprise. Nor
do they benefit the contributing firm alone. Its competitors often share the benefits. In short, such
goodwill expenditures are not functionally integrated with any particular corporation's business op-
erations and are considerably more remote from the bottom line. See Knauer, 44 DePaul L Rev at
49-60,71-74 (cited in note 1) (discussing the importance of the proclaimed benefits of corporate
charitable giving, despite the lack of empirical evidence linking corporate giving to corporate prof-
its);Michelle Sinclair and Joseph Galaskiewicz, Corporate-Nonprofit Partnerships: Varieties and Co-
variates,41 NY L Sch L Rev 1059,1086 (1997) ("Some [charitable] partnerships ... benefit third par-
ties and are difficult to evaluate.").
6 See Jerome L.Himmelstein, Looking Good and Doing Good& Corporate Philanthropy and
Corporate Power 25-28 (Indiana 1997) (noting a fear of government intrusion and regulation as a
reason for corporate giving); Joseph Galaskiewicz, Corporate Contributions to Charity: Nothing More
than a Marketing Strategy, in Richard Magat, ed, Philanthropic Giving:Studies in Varieties and Goals
246,250-52 (Oxford 1989) (discussing contributions as a tax strategy). See also Knauer, 44 DePaul L
Rev at 57-60,57 nn 319-20 (cited in note 1) (analyzing the "halo effect" corporate giving may have
on corporations, especially to compensate for corporate transgressions); Stephen Garone, The Link
between Corporate Citizenship and Financial Performance at 12, Research Report No 1234-99-RR
(Conference Board 1999) (explaining that corporate good citizenship "can help companies smooth
the way to regulatory approvals and reduce the penalties and costs of noncompliance with regula-
tions"); Henry Manne, Book Review: Corporate Control and Business Behavior, 44 J Bus 451,454
(1971).
7 That "benefit" was urged as the "benefit" to the contributing corporations by the proponents
of corporate charity who launched the mid-century campaign for judicial approval. See, for example,
A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co, 98 A2d at 582-83. But over time, special benefit to corporate profit-
ability has been claimed for such contributions. Consider Davis, 13 Can-US L J at 19-28 (cited in
note 4) (discussing both good will and projected profits as reasons for corporate charity). The evi-
dence for such "benefit" (studied in the context of cause-related marketing) consists of reports of fa-
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gitimize the donation and to distinguish it from a gift for which abso-
lutely nothing is received and that would be unauthorized unless ap-
proved unanimously by the stockholders. Our discussion of corporate
charitable donations will be concerned with this goodwill corporate giv-
ing.
The answer to the question of who should have the authority to
make such goodwill gifts turns in fair part on the conception of the
"benefit" that the corporation must receive from making the gift if it is to
be a valid corporate act. Courts have created, and some commentators
have offered, a somewhat strained explanation of what constitutes this
benefit. All recognize that corporations, as inert constructs, are unable to
derive the emotional satisfaction that accrues to the altruistic individual
donor from making a philanthropic gift, or to engage the moral values of
doing so that individuals may pursue. Hence, even if the corporate func-
tion could tolerate expenditures for no conceivable return, the emotional
drive that energizes such gifts by individuals is lacking and the moral
quality of such behavior must be explained on different grounds than
those that explain or support gifts by individuals."
If individual altruism were envisioned, at least in part, as an ex-
change-the gift by the individual "in exchange" for the "benefit" of
feeling virtuous or acting as a moral member of society-an analogy
might be fashioned for corporate giving. The corporation that gives funds
or other assets to a charity, notwithstanding that it receives nothing in re-
turn that can reasonably be traced to identifiable reduced costs or in-
creased revenues or profits, could be said to be making a charitable gift if
"in exchange" therefore it gains some intangible benefit, such as public
vorable consumer, investor, and employee attitudes toward companies that contribute to "good
causes," like curing or preventing cancer, curbing drug abuse, or aiding public education and child-
care. 1999 Cone/Roper Cause-Related Trends Report at 15 (cited in note 4).The Cone/Roper Report
places considerable emphasis on the public's response to cause-related marketing and the views of
"influential Americans" (described as "socially and politically active opinion leaders," id at 4, whose
"lead" Americans follow, id at 8). Garone, The Link between Corporate Citizenship and Financial
Performance (cited in note 6), also relies largely on reported favorable attitudes of investors, con-
sumers, and employees as well as on regulatory benefits. See also Center on Philanthropy at Indiana
University, Giving USA 2001 83 (American Association of Fundraising Counsel Trust for Philan-
thropy 2001).The problematic character of such benefits and recognition of the largely unmet need
to justify, in profit-making terms, all expenditures to produce them are discussed in Paul McAvoy and
Ira Millstein, Corporate Philanthropy vs. Corporate Purpose, in Corporate Philanthropy: Philosophy,
Management, Trends, Background 25 (Council on Foundations 1982).
8 It has been urged that the combination of people, assets, and organization embedded in the
corporate form may appropriately be deemed "enabled" and "obliged" to act morally. See Peter A.
French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility 31-47 (Columbia 1984) (analyzing the corporation as
a moral person); Meir Dan-Cohen, Freedoms of Collective Speech:A Theory of Protected Communi-
cations by Organizations, Communities, and the State,79 Cal L Rev 1229,1244-48 (1991). Even if so,
the only action the corporation can decide to take must be decided by individual human agents. Al-
though under corporate forms and laws governing public investor-owned corporations in the U.S.,




approval of its image as a moral player in society. The "benefit" repre-
sented by such approval, although not the"direct benefit" that early
common law required, has for some time been held (in corporate law) to
justify management authorization of corporate expenditures that pro-
duce no other gain to the corporation or its stockholders. As knowledge-
able commentators have pointed out, the result is that corporations are
empowered, and management is authorized, to make "gifts which, at the
time they are made, are altruistic in the sense that they cannot be justi-
fied as profit-maximizing actions."10
We assume the proposition by which "the classic problem of corpo-
rate philanthropy" is solved: that the intangible benefit a corporation re-
ceives from goodwill giving is not regarded as a "return" from the gift in
deciding whether the gift is charitable, and therefore deductible as such
for federal income tax purposes; but it is regarded as a "return" from the
gift in deciding whether the gift generates a "benefit," which corporate
law has historically required in order to make the gift a permissible ex-
penditure of corporate assets. But the question remains: given the un-
usual character of the expenditure and the "return" or "benefit" from it,
who in the corporate structure should have the authority to designate the
recipients of corporate charitable gift-giving?
Commentators have discussed whether management's decisions to
distribute corporate funds as goodwill gifts should be prohibited or be
restrained by special rules (perhaps requiring shareholder collective con-
sent) fashioned either by legislatures or by courts." Few, however, argue
for the prohibition of all such gifts. Suggested judicially fashioned restric-
tions on management selection of designees are in the fiduciary mode'2
9 See, for example, Corporate Philanthropy Symposiums Transcript of Proceedings-Corporate
Charity: Societal Boon or Shareholder Bust?, 28 Stetson L Rev 52,82-83 (1998) (quoting Professor
Melvin Aron Eisenberg's discussion of morality as a conduct norm for corporate giving).
10 R.Franklin Balotti and James J. Hanks, Jr., Giving at the Office:A Reappraisal of Charitable
Contributions by Corporations, 54 Bus Law 965,967 (1999). The ingenious analyses of economists,
organization theorists, and legal academics explaining all charitable gifts as motivated by, and con-
tributing to, profit maximization do not detract from this conclusion. For a general discussion, see
Rikki Abzug and Natalie J. Webb, Rational and Extra-Rational Motivations for Corporate Giving:
Complementing Economic Theory with Organization Science, 41 NY L Sch L Rev 1035 (1997); Cor-
porate Philanthropy Symposium, 28 Stetson L Rev at 1 (cited in note 1). The contribution of such
gifts to any reasonable concept of the present value of the enterprise is so uncertain and ephemeral
that it can fairly be said to be doubtful that its return equals its cost, much less exceeds it.
11 See Medical Committee for Human Rights v SEC, 432 F2d 659,681 (DC Cir 1970) (discuss-
ing shareholder participation in corporate decisions motivated by morals or philosophy rather than
profit maximization), vacd as moot, 404 US 403 (1972); Fremont-Smith, Philanthropy and the Busi-
ness Corporation at 27-28 (cited in note 4) (relating statistical evidence that shareholders continually
vote down restrictions of the type mentioned in the accompanying text). Compare Political Dona-
tions by Companies:A Consultative Document, URN 99/757 (UK Department of Trade and Industry
Mar 1999) (recommending shareholder approval of corporate donations to political parties). See
also Balotti and Hanks, 54 Bus Law at 992-96 (cited in note 10) (positing a framework to regulate
corporate charitable giving).
12 Compare Baotti and Hanks,54 Bus Law at 992-96 (cited in note 10) (suggesting that courts
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and are likely to constrain management even more modestly than does
the fiduciary concept in restraining more traditional managerial self-
serving behavior.
Another possibility-designation by each stockholder of the benefi-
ciaries of such corporate giving-is generated by the practice of at least
one publicly held corporation." In that case, management decides that a
certain portion of the firm's charitable gifts is to be distributed as goodwill
giving in a particular year and announces to its stockholders that it will
distribute that amount to such enterprises as its stockholders choose indi-
vidually, and to no others. Under a comparable program, each stockholder
would be entitled to direct the distribution of a portion of the aggregate
amount set aside by the corporation that equals the proportion of the
number of shares of common (residual) stock the stockholder owns to the
total number of such shares outstanding. Amounts not thus assigned to
donees could remain in the corporate till or possibly become part of the
pool to be distributed either by management in its discretion or in the
proportions determined by those shareholders who do designate donees.
There is little doubt that management, rather than stockholders,
should decide how much the corporation donates (for example, have re-
sponsibility for setting aside the funds to be given away for goodwill
gifts). That is a function that has much in common with the decision
whether to declare dividends or to reinvest corporate funds. It entails the
problems that centralized management is designed to address. But once
that decision is made, it is not essential for corporate well-being that the
choices of donees of the corporation's goodwill gifts be made by man-
agement or even by shareholder collective action.
It is also reasonably clear that some kinds of corporate contribution
programs are so closely integrated with operational efforts to enhance
sales of products or services or the loyalty and satisfaction of employees
that their operation (including designation of donees) may reasonably be
assimilated to the functions of centralized management. But for contribu-
tions, particularly cash contributions,4 that function solely or predomi-
nantly to build a publicly favorable corporate image or encourage a stable
society congenial to business interests," there are, as we shall see, good
reasons for shareholder intervention.
are best equipped to develop and implement standards overseeing corporate giving, and advocating a
modem rule), with Kahn, 44 UCLA L Rev at 594-609 (cited in note 1) (discussing state legislative ef-
forts regarding the regulation of corporate philanthropy).
13 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Essays of Warren Buffett. Lessons for CorporateAmer-
ica, 19 Cardozo L Rev 5, 47-50 (1997) (reproducing a Buffett letter that is regularly part of the cor-
poration's annual report detailing shareholder participation in designating charitable recipients in
Berkshire Hathaway, Inc).
14 And possibly for corporate charitable contributions in the form of products, if not in the
form of services or use of equipment.
15 For example, contributions to organizations categorized as "Education," "Culture/Arts"
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To be sure, the question of who in the corporate structure should
make such choices is of modest import if the monetary amounts that it
implicates were the only relevant dimension for assessment. During re-
cent years, corporate charitable giving has aggregated little more than 5
percent of total charitable giving in the United States, which in 1998
16amounted to $174.52 billion and in 2000 to $203.45 billion. Of those to-
tals, corporations and corporate foundations gave $8.97 billion or 5.1
percent in 1998 and $10.86 billion or 5.3 percent in 2000. 7 If giving to re-
ligious organizations were excluded (because there is very little such giv-
ing by investor-owned corporations), the corporate portion of total chari-
table giving would have been approximately 9.2 percent in 1998 and 8.4
percent in 2000.'8 Moreover, goodwill giving involves only a portion of
the charitable gifts claimed by corporations."
The amounts involved in such goodwill giving may be modest if
measured against total charitable giving, and trivial if measured against
corporate expenses or gross or net income."h However, the question
(such as enterprises in the performing arts, museums, and libraries), and expressive or advocacy or-
ganizations. For a description of categories of beneficiaries, see Muirhead, Corporate Contributions at
60 (cited in note 4). Contributions to enterprises in the category "Health and Human Services" may
also function in this manner, but their role often combines more immediate benefits to the corpora-
tion.
16 Center on Philanthropy, Giving USA 2001 at20 (cited in note 7).The problem does not exist
significantly in the case of closely held corporations, which are effectively indistinguishable as donors
from their stockholders.
17 Center on Philanthropy, Giving USA 2001 at 20 (cited in note 7); Center on Philanthropy at
Indiana University, Giving USA 1999 20 (American Association of Fundraising Counsel Trust for
Philanthropy 1999).
18 Center on Philanthropy, Giving USA 2001 at 20 (cited in note 7). See also Cunningham, 19
Cardozo L Rev at 54 (cited in note 13) (reproducing a Buffett letter stating that "publicly-held com-
panies almost never allow gifts to churches and synagogues"). Significantly, there is no category "Re-
ligion"in the description of distributees of corporate charity in the Giving USA series or in the Con-
ference Board reports on corporate charitable giving. Computation of total charitable giving to the
category "Religion" could include giving to churches or houses of worship as well as to affiliated or-
ganizations that operate under their umbrella. If the latter gifts are included, religion received, on av-
erage, for the years 1978-1999,50 percent of all charitable gifts. See Center on Philanthropy, Giving
USA 2001 at 87 (cited in note 7). But there was a sharp decline during the last few years to a low of
36.5 percent in 2000. Id.
19 It is difficult to determine how much, if any, of cause-related giving or other sponsored giv-
ing is included in the above figures for corporate charitable giving. For some years such giving is said
to have been close in amount to goodwill giving. See Center on Philanthropy, Giving USA 1999 at 69
(cited in note 17).As the Conference Board has pointed out, "Although companies tend to find that
noncash contributions are more cost-effective and meet the needs of beneficiaries best, they are of-
ten difficult to measure, and are often reported as business expenses instead of contributions. Conse-
quently, contributions budgets do not reflect the totality of giving at many companies." Muirhead,
Corporate Contributions at 9 (cited in note 4).
20 See David R. Morgan, Trends in Corporate Charitable Contributions, 41 NY L Sch L Rev
771,786 (1997) ("[Corporate charitable contributions] are basically an insurance policy against un-
happy consequences that might result were no charitable contribution made at all.");Marina Dund-
jerski, Companies Forecast First Significant Increases in Giving in 5 Years, 7 Chron Philanthropy 12,
12 (Sept 21,1995) (stating that U.S. companies gave less than 1 percent of their pretax income to
charity in 1994). Corporate giving, on average, rarely exceeds 1.5 percent of pretax corporate income,
The University of Chicago Law Review
whether shareholders individually rather than management should be
given the authority to designate donees of corporate goodwill donations
is of some interest, if not importance. The answer to that question impli-
cates considerations of both corporate and stockholder welfare as well as
the public interest in charitable giving.
I. THE VIRTUES (AND VICES) OF SHAREHOLDER CHOICE
Placing authority to designate beneficiaries of corporate charitable
gifts in stockholders individually rather than in management implicates
two kinds of inquiries. One is whether doing so will increase shareholder
wealth-possibly by reducing agency costs and the cost of capital. Sec-
ond, apart from the purely economic question of maximizing shareholder
welfare, there are important public policy questions involved in the allo-
cation of decisionmaking power over corporate goodwill gift-giving.The
function and effect of such giving are less to advantage the enterprise in
the economic market than to give "the corporation" a role in affecting
the kinds of social services to be delivered and the moral values to be
developed in society. Decisions on these matters by corporate manage-
ment may well produce different results than decisions by individual
shareholders.The choice between decisionmaking by the former and de-
cisionmaking by the latter implicates the considerations that underlie
private (nongovernmental) support of charity and not just considerations
affecting corporate efficiency. But exposition is aided by examining the
latter before the former.
A. Corporate Wealth Maximization Does Not Require Management
Selection of Designees of Goodwill Gifts and May Be Better
Served by Individual Stockholder Selection of Such Donees
Before discussing the question whether, as a matter of shareholder
wealth maximization, it is preferable to allocate the choice of donees of
corporate goodwill giving to stockholders individually, it is appropriate
to explain why such an allocation will do little, if any, harm to corporate
efficiency or profitability.
The special managerial competence that is required for (and the
reasons for denying stockholders a role in) corporate decisions that seek
to produce identifiable or measurable enhancement of corporate profit is
rarely, if ever, necessary to determine the distributees of goodwill gifts.
although the proportion varies from year to year, ranging from less than 1 percent to 2.1 percent be-
tween 1970 and 2000. The most frequent level is 1.1 percent. See Center on Philanthropy, Giving
USA 2001 at 33 (cited in note 7). The uneven and changing character of corporate giving and a
breakdown into categories of such giving may be obtained in Muirhead, Corporate Contributions at
60 (cited in note 4), and in annual Conference Board reports, Giving USA, and Fremont-Smith,
Philanthropy at 48-52 (cited in note 4).
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Rather, there are good reasons to vest the power to make the latter kinds
of decisions in stockholders individually, notwithstanding the possible di-
luting effect of this system on the value of the goodwill claimed for such
gifts.
1. A centralized decisionmaking process for goodwill giving is
unnecessary for corporate wealth maximization.
Unlike most expenditures made in the conduct of corporate affairs,
donations that seek to create goodwill are discrete expenditures. 1 They
are not necessary parts of a functionally integrated program of expendi-
tures in producing or distributing goods or services that is designed to
generate a collective return that can only be feasibly and most profitably
achieved by centralized decisionmaking.They are not components of the
marketing process that must be taken into account as part of the firm's
overall program. Nor are they part of a production process that is af-
fected by the selection of particular donees. At the most general level
(for example, gifts to nationally esteemed universities or museums or so-
cial service enterprises), they are not likely to have the stimulating ef-
fects (enhanced employee productivity) claimed to result from gifts to
charities rendering local services in places where the firm has employ-
ees' or from matching gifts programs. Indeed, even the employee loyalty
or incentive effects of those kinds of gifts are not clear. Possibly no loss
in employee productivity would follow if direct increases in compensa-
tion were made instead of such gifts. If so, the substantial function of
such gifts is more to enhance the corporate image as a good citizen than
to increase corporate efficiency or foreseeable profits. There is little need
for such donations-from either the donor's or the recipient's point of
view-to be coordinated by the centralized decisionmaking process of
the kind that is required for financing, producing, or selling the corporate
products or services that are the source of the firm's profits. In short, the
considerations that argue against stockholder participation in corporate
operations do not apply to shareholder decisionmaking about goodwill
giving, regardless of whether such giving meets the requirement of cor-
porate "benefit" as that term is expansively interpreted.3
21 In this respect they contrast sharply with those "charitable" gifts that entail decisions that
cannot rationally be made by yielding to preferences of individual stockholders, or indeed feasibly be
made apart from decisions about other, normal operating affairs of the enterprise.They contrast also
with expenditures that may materially affect operating results, such as expenditure of funds on
equipment to filter exhaust from chimneys or on disposal of toxic wastes.
22 The claim that corporations "need" an educated, if not a specially trained, cadre of potential
employees rarely requires that the choice of donees for such purposes is a decision that can "only," or
even "best," be made by management as a component that is functionally integrated with the firm's
operations.
23 See analysis in Abzug and Webb, 41 NY L Sch L Rev at 1045-58 (cited in note 10).
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The most favorable realistic assessment of the value of managerial
(rather than shareholder) choice of donees of goodwill giving is that it is
part of a larger corporate strategy that will, over time, effect an advanta-
geous public image of the enterprise. This implicates the public attitude
toward government regulation or taxation of business, and toward the
corporation's failure to comply with those prescriptions. Selection of
some tactics rather than others in pursuit of that strategy may be said to
call for contributions directed by management rather than for fractured
gifts by individual stockholders. If the question were simply one of creat-
ing in the public view an image of a philanthropic strand in the corporate
tapestry, it is not clear that a publicly announced program of enabling in-
dividual shareholder giving of corporate assets would not produce a pub-
lic view of the firm equally as benign as that produced by management's
selection of particular beneficiaries.4 It is not irrelevant in assessing the
possible benefit to the corporation of management over stockholder
choice to note that the favorable public attitudes toward business fos-
tered by such giving often accrue not only to the contributing corpora-
tion but also to its competitors and others, and to that extent present
more ephemeral benefits and more complex problems of justification for
any particular enterprise.
25
2. Agency and other costs of managerial discretion in corporate
charitable giving programs.
If operational considerations do not preclude shareholder direction
of such decisionmaking, considerations of "agency costs" suggest special
reason to encourage such direction. Managerial discretion in making
profit-oriented expenditures is bounded by the ties of the process for
producing profits. To be sure, business judgment leaves much elbow
room for managerial discretion in such matters. But strictures against
self-serving limit managerial personal gain from abuse of discretion. The
tie of the expenditure to a profit-making operation sets a boundary, al-
beit permeable, from which to measure self-serving diversion of any por-
tion of the expenditure. In contrast, goodwill giving of corporate funds
(for example, to a museum, "think tank," the opera, or a university) often
results in intangible personal benefits to corporate directors or execu-
tives, such as membership on the donee's board, awards of honors, or
24 The notion, sometimes urged, that the public "expects" the corporation, as a good citizen, to
make charitable contributions, see, for example, A.P Smith Manufacturing Co v Barlow, 98 A2d 581,
585-86 (NJ 1953); Muirhead, Corporate Contributions at 10 (cited in note 4), may or may not be an
accurate statement of what the public "expects." But that putative expectation, which management's
fuglemen generate for management, if not for the public, does not require the choice of donees of
corporate charity to be made by management rather than by stockholders-except as it is an expec-
tation already created by management strategy.
25 See Manne, 59 Va L Rev at 710 (cited in note 1).
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other forms of acclaim by the donee or one's peers.2 Such reciprocity is
too ephemeral to be feasibly identified in court as improperly "pur-
chased" for the manager by the corporate gift.2 The resulting "benefits"
to management may or may not be great, but they hardly correspond to
any identifiable corporate benefit from giving to one donee rather than
to a myriad of others. Moreover, managerial choice of beneficiary may
entail the power to purchase dilution of directorial supervision of mana-
gerial conduct.n Those "benefits" come at stockholder expense from
funds otherwise distributable to stockholders because they are not essen-
tial to corporate operations. The propriety of managerial choices is not
likely to be a subject of monitoring by stockholders,2 particularly since
their choices are not generally publicly identified or ever listed as com-
pensation to executives.1 That the mechanism for making corporate con-
26 See Sinclair and Galaskiewicz, 41 NY L Sch L Rev at 1060 (cited in note 5) (asserting that
charitable contributions "are a form of executive perquisite"); Evelyn Brody, Charities in Tax Re-
form Threats to Subsidies Overt and Covert, 66 Tenn L Rev 687,714-15 (1998) (detailing reasons
other than tax subsidies that might motivate corporate charity); Knauer, 44 DePaul L Rev at 83-85
(cited in note 1) (discussing evidence of increased corporate charity where managers of peer firms
associate with each other in social settings);James R. Boatsman and Sanjay Gupta, Taxes and Corpo-
rate Charity: Empirical Evidence from Micro-Level Panel Data, 49 Natl Tax J 193,199-201 (1996)
(analyzing managerial motivations for corporate giving). See also Cunningham, 19 Cardozo LRevat
52 (cited in note 13) (discussing the incidence of corporations matching gifts made personally by
board incumbents to charities of their choice).
27 See Kahn v Sullivan,594 A2d 48,59-63 (Del 1991) (involving a corporate charitable dona-
tion to fund an art museum to house the corporate controller's collection);Jayne W.Barnard, Corpo-
rate Philanthropy, Executives' Pet Charities and theAgency Problem,41 NY LSchL Rev 1147,1164-
70 (1997) (examining conflicts of interest in the context of executives' pet charities and advocating
disclosure as a check on abuses); E.C. Lashbrooke, Jr., Internal Revenue Code Section 170 and the
Great Corporate Giveaway, 22 Pac L J 221,248 (1991) (arguing that charitable giving is bottom-line
oriented, so charitable deductions should not be allowed); Kahn, 44 UCLA L Rev at 609-25 (cited in
note 1) (analyzing the role of managerial self-interest in corporate charity); Kahn, 41 NY L Sch L
Rev at 1107 (cited in note 2) (discussing the discretionary authority of managers in corporate giving);
Balotti and Hanks, 54 Bus Law at 980-83 (cited in note 10) (criticizing the lack of accountability for
managers' charitable giving decisions);Bill Shaw and Frederick R. Post,A Moral Basis for Corporate
Philosophy, 12 J Bus Ethics 745,750 (1993) (arguing that utilitarianism provides a moral basis for
corporate social responsibility); Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations, 105 Harv L Rev
1578,1612-34 (1992) (arguing for a community values standard to determine tax-exempt status for
charities);Boatsman and Gupta, 49 Natl Tax J at 193 (cited in note 26) (arguing that managers' util-
ity, not profits, motivates corporate charitable giving); Knauer, 44 DePaul L Rev at 83-85 (cited in
note 1) (arguing that corporate giving can be viewed as social currency);Manne,59 Va L Rev at 720-
21 (cited in note 1) (arguing that managerial self-interest may motivate some corporate giving). See
also Cunningham, 19 Cardozo L Rev at 47 (cited in note 13).
28 Richard A. Oppel, Jr. and Floyd Norris, In New Filing, Enron Reports Debt Squeeze, NY
Tunes Cl (Nov 20,2001). Compare Lewis v J.B. Fuqua, 502 A2d 962,965-67 (1985).
29 See Davis, 13 Can-US LJ at 17-19 (cited in note 4) (discussing the lack of enforceable stan-
dards in assessing managerial conduct).
30 A number of companies have gone so far as to attempt to exclude from corporate proxy ma-
terials shareholders' proposals for the corporation to disclose information about its charitable giving:
for example, IBM (Jan 31,1994) and AT&T (Jan 9,1979).
31 An exception to this is so-called "charitable awards" that constitute a form of executive
compensation. See SEC Release No 33-6962 (Oct 21,1992). See also Cunningham, 19 Cardozo L Rev
at 47-54 (cited in note 13) (Buffett letter); General Electric CorpNotice of2002Annual Meeting and
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tributions has evolved from more or less idiosyncratic choices by CEOs
into an organized process with distinct personnel and departments within
the corporate structure of many corporations does not significantly alter
the incentive problem.-
Broader considerations of economic efficiency suggest that manage-
rial decisionmaking may be more costly than permitting individual
stockholders to choose donees of corporate goodwill giving. Stockhold-
ers do not gain from such corporate gifts by subordinating their individ-
ual philanthropic preferences to centralized decisionmaking, except as
the more or less remote benefits from such decisionmaking can be said
to enhance the corporate image and therefore corporate wealth. Any
such ambiguous and uncertain enhancement, however, is bought at the
cost of requiring investors to invest jointly in the corporation's profit-
making activity and its philanthropic activity. If investors were able to in-
vest only in the profit-making activity, rational investors would charge
less for their capital than if its use were tied to charitable giving to don-
ees they have no voice in selecting, particularly if they oppose the activi-
ties of the recipient charity.33 So long as "agency" benefits from such
"bundling" are enjoyed by management, unbundled investments are not
likely to be offered by corporations so as to compete away the bundling
by offering unbundling. To be sure, the matter may not be of large practi-
cal significance in most investors' choices in view of the relatively small
amounts involved. But the aggregate costs are real, and in practice such
giving could affect investors who are self-conscious about charitable
causes.
The corporate benefit, if any, from management designation of cor-
porate goodwill gifts is uncertain in effect and immeasurable in amount,35
and in any event is apt to be modest. Its costs (agency costs and in-
creased cost of capital) are likewise uncertain and difficult to measure. 36
Proxy Statement 14 (2002); General Electric Corp, Notice of 2001 Annual Meeting and Proxy State-
ment 15 (2001).
32 A number of commentators have noted the influence corporate management retains over
corporate charitable giving. See, for example, Kahn, 44 UCLA L Rev at 591 (cited in note 1).
33 It is hard to find many investors who would charge less for the package because they prefer
the bundle (profits plus management choice of charitable donees) to the single item.
34 For example, labor unions and church groups.
35 In summarizing the effects of corporate charitable giving over a period of fifty years, the
Conference Board has said, "[E]vidence is showing that effective corporate citizenship enhances cor-
porate reputation and increases public trust in a company. In addition, there is evidence that the ef-
fect of corporate citizenship on economic performance need not be harmful to shareholder value...
and, in specific instances, can even add to it." Muirhead, Corporate Contributions at 9 (cited in note
4). The question of effect on shareholder value is difficult to answer because, as the Conference
Board report also pointed out, "the amount all companies have given correlates with corporate prof-
its ... [and] closely parallels both individual companies' economic fortunes and executives' attitudes'
Id at 6. It is hard to tell which way causality runs.
36 See generally Garone, The Link between Corporate Citizenship and Financial Performance
(cited in note 6). Compare Boatman and Gupta, 49 Natl Tax J at 194-201 (cited in note 26) (listing
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Placing decisionmaking power in individual stockholders could reduce
those costs, but it may diminish the benefits3 and incur other costs.3" It is
difficult to envision (and to conduct) empirical research that will resolve
the uncertainties as to the balance of corporate benefits and costs. This
leaves the matter at worst undetermined, and at best modestly in favor of
one beneficiary-designating process over the other,39 and on balance, we
believe, in favor of the shareholder choice alternative.
Before turning to the larger policy issues, it is worth noting that it is
unnecessary, in examining or resolving the question of who should
choose donees of corporate charity, to enter or revisit the subject that is
compendiously called "corporate social responsibility." That subject is
concerned with the extent, if any, to which the assets of the corporation
designed to be used in operations seeking to maximize the wealth of its
shareholders should be called upon to meet societal problems. This paper
does not entail examination of that subject because it is concerned with
the uses made only of that portion of the corporation's assets that is not
essential to its wealth-maximizing operations. On the contrary, the ex-
contribution factors and possible costs), with Peter Navarro, Why Do Corporations Give to Charity?,
61 J Bus 65,80-81 (1988). See also Sinclair and Galaskiewicz, 41 NY L Sch L Rev at 1082 (cited in
note 5) (relating agency theory to managerial charitable decisionmaking); Craig Smith, Desperately
Seeking Data: Why Research Is Crucial to the New Corporate Philanthropy, in Dwight F. Burlingame
and Dennis R.Young, eds, Corporate Philanthropy at the Crossroads 1,2 (Indiana 1996) (stating that
CEOs have to justify the costs of charitable contributions).
37 Precluding management from designating beneficiaries of corporate charity and authorizing
stockholders to do so will likely dilute the particular image of corporate "good citizenship" that man-
agement prefers, and it may frustrate fulfillment of the public's "expectation" of such good citizen-
ship. See also note 24. However, in the calculation of lost benefit from denying management choice,
account must be taken of the offsetting benefit to the corporation of a regime in which the corpora-
tion publicly makes the charitable gifts but the designees are selected by stockholders individually
from among recipients that society prefers to subsidize. Any such "lost" benefit is difficult to calcu-
late, particularly since individual stockholder choice of donees is likely to relieve the enterprise of
the cost of stockholder public disagreement and controversy over corporate goodwill gifts. See, for
example, 2001 Annual Report of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc 17 (2001); 2001 Proxy Statement of Berk-
shire Hathaway, Inc 7 (2001).
38 The transaction costs of shareholder choice maybe offset in part by reduction of corporate
staff who attend to charitable giving.
39 While there are many claims of benefits to the corporation from goodwill giving, there is lit-
tie hard evidence. There is anecdotal evidence, and a more persuasive rationale, for recognizing
agency and bundling costs.The benefits lost from, and the costs of, shareholder as compared to man-
agement choice are no more measurable, except perhaps for differences in transactions costs. See
Smith, Desperately Seeking Data at 2-3 (cited in note 36) (arguing that corporate philanthropy is a
business function that, like all business functions, requires research); Sinclair and Galaskiewiez, 41
NY L Sch L Rev at 1076-84 (cited in note 5) (analyzing various factors that may influence corporate
charity) (1997). Compare Boatsman and Gupta, 49 Natl Tax J at 208 (cited in note 26) (disputing the
assumption that charitable giving is motivated by business concerns), with Navarro, Why Do Corpo-
rations Give,61 J Bus at 89-90 (cited in note 36) (arguing that profit maximization is a stronger mo-
tivation than managerial discretion for corporate charitable giving); authorities cited in note 4.
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penditures with which this paper is concerned have a dubious, if nonexis-
tent, function in maximizing the efficiency of corporate operations or of
its shareholders' wealth. The social responsibility involved in this paper
concerns who in the corporation should designate donees of corporate
donations, not whether the corporation has an obligation to make such
donations in the first place.
B. Stockholder Selection of Donees Serves the Societal Values of
Philanthropy and the Function of Private Decisionmaking on the
Objects of Philanthropy Better than Management Selection
Apart from considerations of corporate efficiency, corporate good-
will giving implicates questions of social policy. That "business" plays a
significant role in generating and shaping values in society-by the social
services and welfare programs it chooses to support, by the ideologies it
articulates and public attitudes it encourages through its support of non-
profit expressive associations -is both a "fact" and a continuing aspira-
tion of business.40
It is unnecessary for purposes of this paper to resolve the questions
of whether, or to what extent, private charity should substitute for, or
merely supplement, government support for the goods or services that
charitable enterprises produce." Some of these goods or services cannot
feasibly be offered unless funded by government.42 Others can be sus-
tained entirely by private giving, and indeed, it is fairly argued that gov-
ernment should be precluded from offering them.43 Many can be offered
by enterprises that enjoy the combined support of government and pri-
vate giving." It may be assumed that it is permissible, if not also prefer-
able, for private giving to support some activities that might be sup-
ported by government as well as some that might not be. It is unneces-
sary here to resolve the questions of which activities (or how extensively
they) should be privately supported. It is enough for present purposes to
recognize that private contributions to fund the goods or services pro-
40 J.A.C. Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders Managers; and Corporate Social
Responsibility, 21 Stan L Rev 248,286-92 (1969) (arguing that traditional legal and business theories
have not recognized the role of corporate power in public policy); Muirhead, Corporate Contribu-
tions at 35-47 (cited in note 4); Jerome L. Himmelstein, Corporate Philanthropy and Business Power,
in Dwight F. Burlingame and Dennis R.Young, eds, Corporate Philanthropy at the Crossroads 144,
147-50 (Indiana 1996) (discussing the intimate tie between corporations and nonprofit organiza-
tions).
41 "Private" charity could refer only to voluntary gifts with no government subsidy to the do-
nor or it could refer to private gifts that are government-subsidized, as by tax deductibility to the do-
nor. For present purposes the distinction is irrelevant, although it is worth noting that in the U.S. all
private charitable giving is thus subsidized.
42 For example, employment for individuals whom the private sector "cannot" employ; health
care for those to whom it cannot be supplied adequately by the private sector.
43 For example, religious activities.
44 For example, universities and museums.
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vided by such charitable activities represent private support for a public
purpose. Such donations are essentially "other directed," even though
making them gives personal satisfaction or pleasure to the donors. And
they often function to fund goods or services that create public benefits
but that would otherwise not be offered except possibly by government.5
1. The moral claims of "the corporation" to be a donor
to charity, and their social import.
The essential justification for corporate philanthropy, if any exists, is
grounded in the notion of the corporation as a "member" of society, with
attendant moral and social obligations. The claim that "the corporation"
owes society something in return for the privileges that society makes
available rests either on the premise that each of us "owes" society some-
thing for similar reasons, or that the corporation may be viewed as a spe-
cially privileged entity that owes something special in return for its privi-
leges. On the former view, it is hard to see why stockholders are not more
appropriate selectors than management of how to satisfy that debt,
which is paid from their assets that are not essential for corporate profit-
making. On the latter view, significant questions of policy are raised in
deciding whether management or stockholders should be the designators
of how corporations should pay that debt. That debt to society could be
paid by taxes on the corporation's operations or profits, at least if re-
payment is its function, and therefore selection of distributees is irrele-
vant. But corporate goodwill giving is not simply the payment of a debt
to society. It also entails choosing what kind of "good" society needs or
should have. That the "good" may be deemed to be made available by
reason of the management-stimulated stream of corporate earnings does
not justify giving management, rather than stockholders, the power to
determine what kind of social service or moral "good" a portion of that
stream should nurture.
Notwithstanding theoretical arguments suggesting the existence of
"corporate" capacity for altruism and the legitimacy of "its" participating
in making political or social choices, the only process by which "it" can
make such choices entails action by human beings.' The "corporation," in
and of itself, has no more claim or competence to make charitable dona-
tions to welfare or educational or arts institutions or to generate ideo-
logical values than it has a "soul to be damned [or a] body to be
45 In this connection, it is interesting to note the claim by "business" that, while it cannot re-
place all the needed social services eliminated by government cutbacks, "business" should provide
funding for some of the services eliminated. Muirhead, Corporate Contributions at 35 (cited in note
4). See also note 68.
46 See Shaw and Post, 12JBus Ethics at 745 (cited in note 27) (discussing whether a"corpora-
tion," like an individual, can act charitably).
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kicked."' 7 Nor does "it" have any capacity to "make" such donations ex-
cept as they are caused to be made by human actors who, under current
allocations of power, are the corporation's managers. Whether conceptu-
ally the managers (executives and directors) are "agents" of "the corpo-
ration" or of its stockholders when they make such donations is of small
relevance for present purposes.' In the former case, the "principal" is in-
41capable of telling the agent what donation to make. In the latter case,
the question is whether the "principal" may appropriately claim deci-
sionmaking power for itself/°' It is not simply a matter of management
gaining satisfaction for itself by giving away stockholders' assets. It is the
choice of which donees or "goods" will be subsidized by stockholders' as-
sets that is at issue.
If the choice of donees is seen as an implementation of the moral
principles of the donor, it is hard to see why the choice should be made
by management. It has no special moral competence to make such
choices, at least with assets that are not "its." Nor is it chosen by stock-
holders to do so. And it is not the special function of centralized man-
agement to make those choices about goodwill gifts with assets to which
stockholders have considerably greater claims than does management.
Managers may, and doubtless do, donate their own funds to charita-
ble organizations or enterprises engaged in furthering (or advocating)
social and moral values or welfare services that they prefer. But man-
agement is not engaging in such altruism when it directs donation of
funds that do not belong to it, and from the donation of which it can suf-
fer no cost as a predicate for its moral or emotional satisfaction. What-
ever may be the breadth of the concept "altruism," it does not cover giv-
ing away someone else's "interest" in property for the benefit of still oth-
ers whom the "owner" may have no desire to benefit, and indeed may
object to benefiting." When the donation is made effectively from stock-
47 Mervyn A. King, Public Policy and the Corporation 1 (Chapman and Hall 1997) (quoting
Edward, First Baron Thurlow (1731-1806) on the notion of a corporate conscience); Robert G. Bone,
A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 Cal L Rev 241,285 (1998)
("Corporations... do not possess attributes of personal autonomy or the capacity for intimate rela-
tionships.").
48 It is unnecessary to resolve that question in the context of this paper.
49 The only restraints on management's choice in such matters are either judicial monitoring of
open-ended fiduciary constraints or shareholder monitoring of managerial discretion, neither of
which is apt to be a significant restraint. See Davis, 13 Can-US L J at 17-19 (cited in note 4) (discuss-
ing traditional fiduciary law notions with regard to managerial accountability).
50 If the corporation is viewed as a "nexus of contracts," the question is whether the "contract"
between stockholders and "the corporation" or management should be interpreted to vest charitable
donation power in stockholders rather than management when its "text" is silent on the matter.
51 This is not less true when the gift is made by an agent appointed for other purposes or by a
group organized for other purposes. Individuals could, and no doubt do, yield decisionmaking to oth-
ers on use of donations they altruistically make (for example, expenditures by the recipient organiza-
tions' staffs). But when they invest in profit-seeking corporations, they need not necessarily or ra-
tionally intend to yield discretion as to the moral choice of recipients of charitable donations to man-
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holders' funds, the moral decisionmaking capacity to give, and to select
the donee, whether for altruistic or for ideological choices, is more ap-
propriately found in those who can claim forgoing some sort of owner-
ship interest in the property being given to support the donees' activities.
If such expenditures by management are justifiable as gifts to support
the donors' moral principles, at the very least they require stockholder
acquiescence.
As investment incentives and corporate charitable giving are cur-
rently structured in our society, stockholder investment in corporations
in pursuit of profit hardly constitutes acquiescence in empowerment of
management to choose the recipients of corporate goodwill giving.2 The
implicit (or explicit) consent of investors to centralized management is to
directing the enhancement of corporate wealth. It is not given (and need
not be given) to effect management's distribution to others of surplus for
which the corporation has little or no wealth-increasing use.
In sum, insofar as the selection of charitable recipients should be a
response to a felt private preference or moral decision to donate one's
property, the stockholders as human beings living in the society are more
legitimate determiners of that response than is "the corporation" and
"its" stream of earnings or its managers.
No less important is society's interest in its citizens developing and
enjoying the virtuous feeling of philanthropic giving to others in society.
Philanthropic behavior connects donors to other citizens and encourages
their concern with the well-being of others. The corporation lacks the
emotional or psychological capacity for that concern. To the extent that
such concern among its citizens is a social desideratum, shareholder
choice of donees of corporate charitable giving better meets that aspira-
tion than does managerial choice-both because of the larger number of
givers thus encouraged to share that concern and because of the larger
spread of objects of such concern.
agement or fellow stockholders.
52 The difficulties that attend obtaining actual consent from dispersed stockholders when it is
expressly requested in order to approve managerial self-dealing are nothing compared to those at-
tending the claim that the act of investing for profit constitutes actual consent to managerial selec-
tion of particular goodwill gifts. Apart from all the problems of rational apathy and free riding that
affect any expression of shareholder consent, such consent requires adequate disclosure by manage-
ment, a factor that is absent in managerial selection of donees of goodwill giving. See Kahn, 44
UCLA L Rev at 661-62 (cited in note 1) (asserting that actual shareholder consent depends on ade-
quate information, which is lacking because of insufficient charitable contribution disclosure);Kahn,
41 NY L Sch L Rev at 1132-44 (cited in note 2) (addressing the problems of silence and disclosure in
the federal securities regulations). Given that goodwill gifts are often a trivial portion of total corpo-
rate expenditures, it is difficult to claim that such giving is an expression of a shareholder's particular
moral or ideological preferences or consent to the use by managers of corporate funds for support of
any moral or ideological preferences held by the managers.
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2. The societal claims for dispersion of donors (and donees) of
corporate charity.
Apart from deferring to the donors' altruism or moral preferences
as a premise for requiring individual stockholders rather than manage-
ment to choose donees of corporate charitable gifts, the role of charity in
the society argues against vesting such power in management rather than
stockholders. The use of the assets thus given is a use that serves a public
good more than a corporate good." The donor is making the choice of a
particular public good to serve. If the government provided that good,
there is some basis for believing that the choice would be made by per-
sons whom the public chooses to make such choices and who are respon-
sive to that public. When a public good is to be furnished by private
choice, the notion of the public function performed by supplying the
good suggests that while individual selectors may be private, overall the
selectors of the good should reflect a broader, rather than a narrower,
cross-section of the public. ' To effectuate that policy, society appropri-
ately may seek to restrict the corporation's ability to give away share-
holders' property by allocating decisionmaking power to one set rather
than another set of participants in the corporation. Without resort to the
undesirable (and generally intolerable) limits that would be effected by
proscribing or prescribing particular charitable gifts or kinds of gifts, the
state's corporate rules may, and inevitably will, encourage or discourage
such donations by a broader or narrower array of donors to a broader or
narrower array of potential donees.
The moral or ideological premises that dictate or limit government's
power collectively to allocate or distribute benefits to society and its
members do not limit private charitable giving." Private funders of chari-
ties respond to innovative, experimental, and varied motives that do not
and possibly should not underpin government funding. Fracturing the
corporate donations into streams that stockholders individually prefer
will support a broader and more varied array of social services, moral
values, and ideologies than management is likely to support. It will corre-
spond more accurately with individual stockholder preferences,5' limited
as they may be. One of the principal premises that is said to underlie so-
53 See Himmelstein, Corporate Philanthropy and Business Power at 147-50 (cited in note 40)
(discussing the corporate interest in supporting charity as an effort to stem the growth of govern-
ment).
54 This is not to deny that particular individual donors should be free to seek altruistically to
benefit particular recipients more than society would.
55 For example, support for religious causes or expression; support for "radical" or unpopular
social groups.
56 This is certainly true with respect to satisfying preferences in making donations, for example,
to religious institutions, the arts, education, or ideological organizations. It is also likely to be true in
the matter of funding social services, medical care, or comparable purposes.
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ciety's interest in charitable giving by its members contemplates the sup-
port of a variety of recipients serving a variety of ends that are selected
by a range of individuals- a thousand points of light.' Pluralism in sup-
port of social services, like pluralism in expression of social or moral
views, argues strongly for preference for shareholder over managerial
designation of corporate goodwill giving. The socially and experientially
dispersed shareholders (although far from representative) are more
likely to respond to the different preferences and needs for social ser-
vices in the society than is corporate management. Corporate manage-
ment is not only a narrower segment of possible charitable donors than
dispersed stockholders, but also may well hold views of the public good
that will, more than stockholders' views, scant the interests of some por-
tions of the public that, in the absence of government support, it is a le-
gitimate function of private charity to serve.58
C. Implementing Shareholder Choice
One mechanism for implementing shareholder choice is a statute
mandating it for all public investor-owned corporations. Another, prefer-
able, mechanism is a revision of the Internal Revenue Code to permit
corporate donations or expenditures to be deducted by those corpora-
tions as "charitable" only if the donees are designated as such by stock-
holders individually.59 If an expenditure is made in normal profit seeking
operations, shareholder involvement is not appropriate and the expendi-
ture should be deductible by the corporation,.- but not as a charitable
contribution.
57 See Frank Prochaska, Capitalism with a Human Face, Times Literary Supp 14,14 (Feb 9,
2001) (chronicling a movement to revive philanthropy in Great Britain); Mark A. Hall and John D.
Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax Exemption,52 Ohio St L J 1379,1384-85 (1991)
(proposing that the variety of options to a donor helps reveal which charities are of special worth).
58 Corporate contributions to local charities through intermediate distributing organizations
seem to have been funneled largely through United Way enterprises in cities across the nation, at
least as suggested by Conference Board annual studies. See, for example, Andris Tillnan, Contribu-
tions in 199726 (Conference Board 1999).See also John A.Yankey, Corporate Support of Nonprofit
Organizations, in Dwight F. Burlingame and Dennis R.Young, Corporate Philanthropy at the Cross-
roads 7,18-20 (Indiana 1996) (discussing the United Way and corporate charity).The United Way is
not known to favor as recipients of its allocating function newly formed innovative enterprises or
those that focus on unconventional causes.Those groups are often served by community distributing
organizations other than the United Way.
59 Compare 26 USC § 170(c) (providing for a charitable deduction for corporate donations but
not requiring shareholder involvement).
60 Corporate expenses incurred by management can be deducted if they constitute a business
expense. 26 USC § 162. In order to constitute a business expense, the expenditure must be made with
a "reasonable expectation of financial return commensurate with the amount of the transfer." 26
CFR § 1.170A-1(c)(5) (2002). Charitable or other contributions designated by stockholders are not
likely to be considered "business expenses." Whether a deduction is allowed under 26 USC § 162 or
26 USC § 170 might not be a matter of indifference if the contribution is regarded as a capital expen-
diture. The deductibility under 26 USC § 162 of a capital expenditure would typically be deferred.
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If a program of stockholder-designated goodwill giving is desirable,
there is reason to embody it in federal legislation rather than to let it
vary from state to state. The problem, at least for publicly held corpora-
tions, is national, from the points of view both of the donors and the
61
donees. There is thus little question of Congress's power to allocate to
stockholders of public investor-owned corporations the authority to
choose donees of corporate charity under the Commerce Clause' and no
question under its taxing power.6 If Congress thus has the power to act,
none of the restraints on its power under the Contracts, Due Process, or
Equal Protection Clauses can seriously be urged to preclude legislation
favoring shareholder choice. It is not constitutionally ordained that each
kind of corporate expenditure be made only by management or only by
stockholders or by any particular combination of them. Government se-
lection of some areas of corporate activity, like charitable expenditures
for shareholder decisionmaking and others for management decision-
making, raises no serious constitutional questions in view of the reason-
ableness of the classification of activities and the connection of the classi-
fication itself with reasonable allocation of decisionmaking power. Nor is
there any serious question under the First Amendment. Shareholder
choice is not designed to, nor does it, suppress or curtail speech. It simply
increases the number and variety of possible voices.
See Linda Sugin, Theories of the Corporation and the Tax Treatment of Corporate Philanthropy, 41
NY L Sch L Rev 835,845 n 53 (1997). Providing that an expenditure is charitable only if it is desig-
nated by shareholders individually would relieve the IRS and managers of the problems of "correct"
characterization of the expenditures.
61 Corporate goodwill giving is not limited to charities that function in the states in which the
corporation is incorporated. Much corporate charitable giving affects donees in the areas in which
the corporation operates, and to that extent may be said to be local. But for large corporations with
multistate operations, many states (least of all probably the state of incorporation) are involved. In
any event, goodwill giving has a broader public purchase. Moreover, the stockholders whose claims
are affected are not localized to the donees. Both the stockholders and the beneficiaries affected are
dispersed over the entire nation and the amounts involved, at least when aggregated, are not trivial.
It is hard to see why donor corporations incorporated in Delaware or New York, but whose opera-
tions and donees (and beneficiaries) are elsewhere, should (or must) be subject only to that local law
in the internal allocation of corporate power to designate donees.
62 Neither United States v Lopez, 514 US 549,562 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School
Zones Act exceeded congressional authority under the Commerce Clause), nor United States v Mor-
rison, 529 US 598,613 (2000) (holding that the Violence Against Women Act exceeded congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause), nor their adumbrations preclude Congress from regulating
the allocation of power within the large business corporation to engage in goodwill or other "chari-
table" giving.
63 The power of Congress to grant deductions for charitable giving is broad enough to support
predicating the deduction on a prescription addressed to securing wide dispersion or variation in do-
nors-as by allocating the corporate authority to choose recipients between management and stock-
holders. Compare South Dakota v Dole, 483 US 203,210 (1987) (holding that Congress's spending
power may be used indirectly to influence states' drinking-age policies), with, for example, United
States v Kahriger, 345 US 22,31 (1953) (holding that the indirect effects of Congress's taxing power
do not make a wagering tax unconstitutional). See also Marchetti v United States, 390 US 39,44
(1958) (stating that Congress has the power to tax illegal activities).
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II. SOME CONSEQUENCES OF SHAREHOLDER CHOICE
If in theory stockholder choice is to be preferred over management
designation, there remain significant empirical questions concerning the
consequences of implementing shareholder choice.
A. Alteration of the Aggregate Amount of Charitable Giving
The net cost to society in lost charitable dollars (if this is viewed as a
loss) of allocating choice of corporate goodwill giving to stockholders is
ideally nil. But in practice it may be more than modest if fracturing deci-
sionmaking power will diminish the aggregate amounts that individuals
will give or that corporations will set aside for such goodwill giving, or
preclude the benefits of long-term strategies that are funded by system-
atic giving of large sums by corporate donors to particular donees. How-
ever, it is not clear that, in the aggregate, lesser amounts will be given
from "corporate funds" if corporate gifts are individually designated, or
how significant any possible diminution in such support will be.
It is probable that if individual stockholders were given the funds by
the corporation, they would not make as large an aggregate contribution
to charitable enterprises as would corporate management. The probabil-
ity arises because if stockholders have the funds in their possession, the
endowment effect and free-rider considerations may limit the aggregate
amounts of their gifts to less than management (which is not giving away
its own money) would have given on behalf of the corporation itself.
There could, therefore, be some difference in the aggregate amount of
corporate charitable giving.
But the phenomenon is mitigated if each shareholder's failure to
designate a recipient for his or her pro rata share of the pool results in
that share being retained by the corporation or in its common pool for
such gifts. In such a framework, the psychological impulse to refrain from
giving what is in one's pocket is diminished.A stockholder who thus has
nothing to gain from refraining from making the gift, and indeed has
something to lose in the sense that the monies go back into a common
pool possibly to be distributed by other stockholders, is more likely to
make the gift than if the funds were in the stockholder's pocket alone.6M
Present income tax structure suggests that if instead of the corpora-
tion making the gift and receiving a deduction in computing taxable in-
come, it distributed the funds as dividends and the individual recipients
made their own charitable gifts, there might be a loss in the amount of
funds available for charity because of the absence of the deduction at the
corporate level and the tax on the dividend to the stockholder. But if the
64 Berkshire Hathaway's experience suggests little diminution, although Berkshire Hathaway is
hardly an ordinary corporation. See Cunningham, 19 Cardozo L Rev at 50 (cited in note 13).
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stockholder's choice is limited to directing the making of the gift or let-
ting the funds remain in the corporate till, the transaction may not be re-
garded as a dividend taxable to the stockholder. Any doubt on the mat-
ter can be resolved by appropriate legislation, which need not alter the
present amount of tax revenue and burden effects.
Management set-asides for corporate goodwill giving by each share-
holder, rather than payment of the funds directly to shareholders for
each to make (or not make) a gift, might satisfy certain claimed con-
ceptions of the corporation's "good citizen" obligations. Thus "pressur-
ing" the stockholders to give, rather than to keep the funds in the corpo-
ration or let others designate donees, can serve the function of assuring
that some portion of the profits it generates will "go back" to society. It
deprives the shareholders of the freedom to refrain from any charitable
giving with those funds. But that leaves them no worse off than under the
regime of managerial discretion to choose donees. To be sure, individual
donors of portions of the corporate pool may reduce the amount they
would otherwise give to charity from their own funds. But it is problem-
atic whether in the matter of altruism such rational calculation will result
in significant reduction in aggregate individual giving.
Individualizing corporate contributions may incur other costs, but
their magnitude is difficult to measure. Thus, corporate giving under
management auspices may make possible the continuous relationship of
a single donor of large amounts to long-term programs of a charitable in-
stitution.This relationship facilitates planning of costly programs that are
to be executed over a long period and monitoring their performance by
the donor. The value of such continuity may be lost if corporate giving is
fractured into donations designated by individual stockholders. It is pos-
sible that similar arrangements-and the values thus generated-may re-
sult from systematic designation of donations by individual holders of a
corporation's stock or by their foundations, particularly if they act to-
gether on projects that they prefer. But it is not unlikely that there will
be some loss of philanthropic support for charitable projects financed by
corporate donations. However, that loss is likely to be offset by dona-
tions from many individual designators to other charitable recipients.
Whether there will be a net economic or social gain or loss from thus in-
dividualizing is hard to predict.66
65 Consider Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, The Framing Decisions and the Psychology
of Choice,211 Science 453 (1981) (discussing the "dependence of preferences on the formulation of
decision problems"); Richard H. Thaler, The Winner's Curse: Paradoxes andAnomalies of Economic
Life 107-22 (1992) (discussing the framing of mental accounts and the resulting nonfungibility of dif-
ferent forms of saving).
66 The question is made particularly difficult to answer in light of the stability afforded to many
long-term welfare services by the crucial role of government in funding (both absolutely and in pro-
portion to other funding) organizations providing such services. A more substantial problem that
shifting power to stockholders to select charitable donees may cause relates to the burgeoning
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More directly relevant to the possible reduction in the amounts re-
ceived by charities from goodwill giving is the likelihood that mandating
deference to individual stockholder choice will cause management to de-
cline to authorize any or much goodwill charitable giving because it can-
not choose the donees. Management may believe that the corporation
will lose, both in terms of its reputation and by loss of the kind of social
stability and atmosphere that enhance its wealth-creating capacity, if in-
stead of management's wisdom guiding the giving, the fractured choices
of dispersed stockholders determine the identities of the beneficiaries. 7
There is also the question whether, even if there were little impact
on corporate well-being of fracturing this particular kind of charitable
giving, management would simply decline to set aside funds for such ef-
forts. It might so decline simply because it would lose the satisfaction
(and the benefits) it now gets for the gifts it causes the corporation to
make to particular donees. On the premises of corporate law, such rea-
sons for declining to give might well not be legitimate. But it would be
hard to ferret out those reasons as the basis for management's declina-
tion so as to nullify the declination by imposing costs on management for
that illegitimacy. Management reluctance to set aside corporate funds for
goodwill giving may thus cause a much larger reduction in the candle-
power of a thousand points of light. Such reduction may be significantly
lessened, if not eliminated, by authorizing management to designate pos-
sible donees for individual shareholder giving, but leaving each share-
holder free to choose from such designees or to select others.
To ascertain the appropriate level of philanthropy, or even only of
corporate charitable giving, in the society entails incalculable variables,
and any conclusion reached would be ambiguous, if not disputable. If
such a level were ascertained, and shareholder choice could be shown to
be likely to produce less than enough total philanthropic giving than
movement of government-business partnership in funding and operating "charitable" enterprises,
such as training young people or retraining others for work skills.Whether the partnership takes the
shape of a special government corporation or a separate charitable entity, and whether the services it
renders are only training in skills or knowledge related to work or include other "goods," the notion
of such government-business cooperation rests on the assumption of management decisions about
the levels and kinds of corporate participation. For a general discussion, see Nancy J. Knauer, Rein-
venting Government: The Promise of Institutional Choice and Government Created Charitable Or-
ganizations, 41 NY L Sch L Rev 945 (1997); Community Leaders Trumpet the Rise of Social Enter-
prise, Harv Univ Gazette (Feb 24,2000), available online at <http://www.newsharvard.edulgazettel
2000/02.24/social.html> (visited Mar 24,2002) (discussing the rise in cooperation between private
business and nonprofits to effect social change). Possibly stockholder selection of donees of corpo-
rate assets would hamper such programs.
67 Cause-related marketing gifts and similar expenditures that are part of normal corporate
revenue-increasing, or cost-decreasing, activities may be diminished if the corporation is not allowed
a deduction under 26 USC § 162, and if management believes that this sort of giving will not be cost-
effective if done by shareholders. But this depends upon the gifts being, and the IRS finding them to
be, more (or less) operationally functional rather than charitable. Compare note 60.
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would managerial choice, acceptable measures-possibly by way of tax
treatment-could be adopted to create incentives for larger corporate or
individual giving.
B. Alteration of Distributees of Charitable Giving
Corporate management is constrained in its choice of recipients. It is
stimulated to choose recipients of the kind that government is under
popular pressure to provide, if only because charitable giving thus lessens
the pressure for government funding and attendant regulatory and tax
consequences that management believes onerous for business." Structur-
ally, corporate giving, no matter how varied the constituencies that man-
agement or staff might personally prefer as recipients,6 is limited by the
constraints of appearing to serve the corporate interest or at least not to
injure it. Corporate gifts to controversial charities are not popular with
management, even though some managements are not daunted by at-
tracting unnecessary controversy."' And quite apart from limitations on
"giving" caused by the desire to avoid recipients that offer controversial
social services, management-directed distributions are likely to go to
charities that render services that support values that management con-
siders useful to a "stable" climate for business.' Moreover, the culture in
which management and management-giving evolves imposes its own
limitations on management's conception of "worthy" recipients.2 Criti-
cism of the range of causes and organizations funded by corporate dona-
tions has been levied by both those on the left and those on the right.
68 See Himmelstein, Looking Good and Doing Good at 25-31 (cited in note 6) (discussing the
rise in the culture of corporate philanthropy); Knauer, 41 NY L Sch L Rev at 959 (cited in note 66)
(discussing tax incentives for corporate giving); Garone, The Link between Corporate Citizenship and
Financial Performance (cited in note 6); McAvoy and Millstein, Corporate Philanthropy v& Corporate
Purpose at 25-26 (cited in note 7) (discussing the need for corporations to fill voids created by gov-
ernment cutbacks). See also note 45.
69 See -ildy J. Simmons, Symposium: Corporate Philanthropy: Law, Culture Education and
Politics: Luncheon Address,41 NY L Sch L Rev 1013,1013-21 (1997); Himmelstein, Looking Good
and Doing Good at 38-55 (cited in note 6) (discussing the views of employees of corporate charitable
giving departments).
70 See Richard Gibson, Boycott Drive against Pioneer Hi-Bred Shows Perils of Corporate
Philanthropy, Wall St J B1 (June 10, 1992) (describing the controversy over Pioneer's support of
Planned Parenthood); Himmelstein, Looking Good and Doing Good at 115-20 (cited in note 6)
(describing the lack of response corporations give to criticisms by the Capital Research Center of
their charitable giving). See 2001 Annual Report of Berkshire Hathaway (cited in 37); 2001 Proxy
Statement of Berkshire Hathaway (cited in 37).
71 See Himmelstein, Looking Good and Doing Good at 120-24 (cited in note 6) (discussing
disagreements over the proper role business has in society).
72 See id at 14-15,35-37 (discussing the corporate charitable giving phenomenon as a collective
business activity); Joseph Galaskiewicz, Professional Networks and the Institutionalization of a Single
Mind Set, 50 Am Soc Rev 639,655-56 (1985) (evaluating the influence of job status, professional




At best, the center and breadth of the range of services that man-
agement is likely to support through corporate charitable giving are apt
to be close to the center and breadth of the range of government-
supported services, and the focus is more likely to be on services (for
needy and not needy) that support, rather than question, prevailing so-
cial values. In the aggregate, individual stockholders who are not con-
strained by such considerations are more likely to distribute donations to
services that implicate more extreme social values-those that prevailing
mores may find too liberal or too conservative.
Casual examination of readily available sources' suggests difficulties
in relying on reported past performance as the basis for predicting future
behavior, if only because the classifications of distributees and of the dis-
tribution of total giving among them are ambiguous.7 The only relatively
clear prediction is that if individuals acting as shareholders were to allo-
cate corporate gifts in the same proportions as they have done in the past
few years as individuals, a substantial portion of corporate gifts would be
directed to recipients in the category "Religion" and a corresponding
portion would be diverted from other recipients.S
More extensive research than we have conducted is necessary be-
fore acceptable estimates can be made of the distributive effects of
shareholder choice of distributees other than "Religion." The limited
data available permits only speculation about the direction of change
among other distributees. If aggregate corporate gifts are not diminished
by allocating power to stockholders, possibly the diversion will diminish
slightly the proportion of distributed funds to recipients in the combined
categories "Culture and Arts" and "Education." By the same token, there
is apt to be some increase in the proportion received by enterprises in
the category "Health and Human Services, 7'6 but perhaps allocated dif-
ferently among those organizations.
73 For example, the Conference Board reports and Giving USA.
74 The Conference Board's classifications are set forth in one of its research reports. See Muir-
head, Corporate Contributions at 60 (cited in note 4). Because the Board's surveys may include only
limited nonrandom selections of corporations, its results may not adequately reflect the larger pic-
ture. See Center on Philanthropy, Giving USA 2001 at 78 (cited in note 7).
75 During 1978-99, total giving to "Religion" averaged 50 percent of total giving, with gifts de-
clining in 1999 to 44 percent and in 2000 to 36.5 percent. Center on Philanthropy, Giving USA 2001 at
21 (cited in note 7). Corporate charitable donations generally have not gone to "Religion" See also
note 18.
76 Cunningham, 19 Cardozo L Rev at 53-54 (cited in note 13) (detailing the distribution of in-
dividual Berkshire Hathaway stockholder charitable contributions). Comparison of the proportion-
ate charitable contributions over time of corporations with those of all of society suggests that recipi-
ent in the category Health and Human Services will gain slightly and those in the categories Educa-
tion and Culture/Arts will lose slightly if individual shareholders designate corporate donees. See
Center on Philanthropy, Corporate Giving USA at 21,78 (cited in note 7); Center on Philanthropy,
Corporate Giving USA 1999 at 21,68 (cited in note 17). Compare Tillman, Contributions in 199723-
25 (cited in note 58).
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Corporate goodwill gifts by management are made not only to or-
ganizations rendering services but also to expressive associations. In gen-
eral, that form of giving supports the explicit communications offered by
nonprofit enterprises engaged in expressing ideological views that man-
agement is likely to favor."
Decisions about social values and how society should be organized
to achieve them affect more than the prosperity of the enterprise in
which the shareholders have a common interest for which they may ap-
propriately delegate decisionmaking to management. Neither the con-
cept of government regulation (or freedom therefrom) nor the social
climate for business is divinely ordained or a natural phenomenon. The
former is, albeit imperfectly, the product of political choices that, in de-
mocratic theory, are made (if generally indirectly) in response to popular
vote on how the society should be organized, its "goods" produced and
distributed, and its "goals" effected. The latter is affected in fair part by
inputs in the communications offered to the members of the society by
those having access to communications facilities.
No doubt stockholders, like managers, value private property and
appreciate a climate friendly to business. But a climate congenial to busi-
ness does not necessarily serve other "goods" that human beings, includ-
ing stockholders, hold dear, and may entail some "bads" that they op-
pose. In the tensions, not to mention conflicts, between those values and
friendliness to "business" or over the propriety of government taxation
or regulation, different people have different preferences. Many may
prefer a climate that, in deference to other values, supports some gov-
ernment regulation that a management selected to maximize profits
would-and maybe should-oppose. Others believe that management-
directed contributions go to enterprises expressing views that are not suf-
ficiently friendly to business-indeed are antithetical to a free society.8
Overall, if individual shareholder selection replaces managerial des-
ignation of donees of corporate goodwill gifts, it is probable that no
fewer funds will go from the shareholders' pool to relatively established
charitable enterprises that render conventional services to the deserving
poor. But charities offering innovative, and indeed unpopular, kinds of
social services to the undeserving poor are likely to receive, in the aggre-
gate, more funds from individual shareholders than from corporate man-
77 See, for example, David M. Ricci, The Transformation ofnAmerican Politics: The New Wash-
ington and the Rise of Think Tanks 149-81 (Yale 1993) (describing the anatomy of the modem think
tank); Himmelstein, Corporate Philanthropy and Business Power at 150 (cited in note 40) ("[C]orpo-
rate philanthropy appears ... to promote the general interest of business."); Oliver A. Houck, With
Charity for All, 93 Yale L J 1415,1455-57 (1984).
78 See, for exampleWilliam E. Simon,A Time for Truth 231-33 (Reader's Digest 1978) (criticiz-
ing business donations to organizations that do not promote capitalism). See also Memorandum
from Lewis F Powell, Jr. to Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr. (Aug 23,1971) (on file with authors).
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agement. In the same vein, expressive associations with more strident
ideological voices are likely to be gainers from individual shareholder
designation of beneficiaries. More funds will likely go to support more
conservative views than more liberal ones. At the same time, organiza-
tions voicing critical, or even radical, social and political views are also
likely to receive more funds from individual shareholder designation
than from management selection of corporate donees.
III. PROBLEMS OF ADMINISTRATION
Even if stockholder choice is desirable and lawful, there are impor-
tant practical questions that go to the administrative feasibility and trans-
action costs of such a regime. One problem arises over how to define the
class or classes of stock whose holders are to be given individual choice
and in what amounts or proportions. How should preferred stock,
convertible or other hybrids, and debt securities be treated? One possi-
ble (and preferable) solution is to require designation only by holders of
claims to residual value (common stock).
For corporations with millions of holders of common stock, there
are the standard problems associated with accounting for the wishes of
holders of small lots and the resulting transactions costs. Both may be
significantly reduced by making stockholder choice available through
proxy material, which would have the incidental benefit of encouraging
stockholder voting. To be sure, it is more complicated to proportionalize
and effectuate a designated contribution by the holder of a small lot than
to aggregate his or her votes; and the variety of possible designees sug-
gests that aggregation of designated contributions is not likely to func-
tion as simply as aggregation of votes. Considerations of feasibility and
cost-saving may, or may not, justify restricting the power to designate
contributions to gifts of not less than a certain amount and letting the
unused part of the charitable pool (as not all shareholders will be able to
meet the threshold) go as management designates or pro rata as the used
part is directed by other stockholders.
Of import also are the problems associated with designation by in-
stitutional investors (mutual funds, banks, insurance companies, pension
funds).The need for a workable solution of the problem for institutional
investors is significant in view of the magnitude of their holdings. Obliga-
tions to pass-through to individuals the power to designate donees could
be imposed, although not without cost. For those organizations for which
such obligations are necessary, such as close corporations, exclusions
could be crafted. It is also possible that institutional holders might be
disqualified from designating donees of portfolio companies' charitable
giving unless the institutions offered an acceptable mechanism for giving
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choice to their individual stockholders or participants.7 In the absence of
such mechanisms, the portions of the portfolio companies' charitable
pools that therefore cannot be passed through institutional holders
would be added to the those companies' pools for choice of designees by
their individual shareholders.
The problems surrounding administration are difficult and indeed
crucial. In the end, they may make shareholder choice of corporate
goodwill donations unfeasible. But the cost of considering the wisdom of
such proposals is modest, and not without benefit. Partial solutions may
be feasible. The ingenuity of the corporate bar and its academic col-
leagues should not be underestimated.
79 Compare Investment Company Act of 1940,15 USC § 80a-12(d)(1)(E)(iii) (2000).
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